Iraqi Prospect Organisation analyses “de-Baathification”

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Crushing the insurgency and stabilising Iraq
The need for a brave decision from Washington
By Sama Hadad

Monday, November 23, 2004

Published: openDemocracy

American and new Iraqi forces rapidly occupied the insurgent
stronghold city of Falluja and are almost in complete control. While
the military campaign has been a success the fact there was a need for
Operation Phantom Fury signals a significant failure of policy -
namely that of 're-Ba'athification'.

Following the fall of Saddam, Ayad Allawi, along with his supporters
in Washington, fiercely opposed both de-Baathification, and the
disbanding of the former Saddam army. Because Allawi's Iraqi National
Accord draws its support from former Baathists and the Sunni elite,
his opposition to the de-Baathification policy is understandable.
Whilst American forces had Falluja in a tight grip in April, mounting
international pressure and civilian casualties led Washington to
abandon its year-old de-Baathification policy and to resort to forming
the Falluja Brigade made up of former Baathists. This signaled the
beginning of a wave of appointments of high ranking Baathists to top
security service and government posts - just as Allawi had been
advocating. Their thinking was that appointing former Sunni elite and
Baathists in positions of power would kill two birds with one stone:
make use of their 'expertise' as well as appease the Sunni population.
Falluja was left in the hands of a newly formed Falluja Brigade, under
the command of Jasim Muhammed Salih. To the embarrassment of the CPA,
Salih was removed days after his appointment because opposition
mounted against his past as a chief of staff of one of Saddam's
Republican Guard Brigades and participation in the bloody quelling of
the 1991 uprising. The Falluja Brigade command was then handed to a
former Saddam intelligence officer, Mohammed Abdul Latif. As
insurgency activity unsurprisingly soared once more in Falluja,
coalition forces eventually found the Falluja Brigade to be working
'with them' by day and planning and executing insurgency activity by
night. The Brigade was eventually disbanded in September.

Whilst the mess of the Falluja Brigade symbolises the incompetence of
the 're-Baathification' policy and has served to bring us full circle
back to where we were in April, there have been far more dangerous
repercussions of this policy. Allawi's aggressive re-Baathification of
the government and security services has paved the way for such people
as Amer al-Hashimi to be appointed chief of staff of Iraq's new army.
Al-Hashimi, a Salafi ex-Major General in Saddam's army, was eventually
fired last August as it became apparent he was supplying Salafi
insurgents with intelligence and appointing them to high ranks in the
new army. More worryingly, not only was al-Hashimi replaced by
Mohammed Abdul-Qadr, former Baathist Governor of Mosul and deputy
chief of staff under Saddam, but al-Hashimi himself has since been
appointed an advisor to the Ministry of Defence.

Allawi's policy has also seen the appointment of Talib Al-Lahibi as
commander of the new Iraqi National Guard for the province of Diyala.
Al-Lahibi, a former Saddam officer, was eventually arrested in
September as it came to light he was leading the insurgency in Diyala.
What may prove to be Allawi's most close-to-home re-Baathification
blunder, was his appointment of former Baathist, Yousef Khalaf
Mahmood, as head of security for the Iraqi interim cabinet - an
individual who would never have been appointed to such a post under
de-Baathification. Mahmood was arrested at the end of October after it
transpired he was working with the insurgents and had supplied them
with the names and addresses of every government official and
ministerial staff. Six staff and their family members have already
been murdered in their homes. Such a grave mistake will serve to keep
insurgents busy for months to come. And so, the very people Iraq is
relying upon to help its rebuilding and democratisation are now
sitting ducks.

Thanks to the active reinstatement of Sunni elite and former
Baathists, leadership of the new Iraqi security forces is once again
Sunni-dominated, as it had been the four decades under Saddam. The
weeks and months have proved that not only are high ranking Sunnis
exacerbating Iraq's insecurity, but even low ranking Sunnis cannot be
relied upon to carry out their duties - in one Iraqi unit alone in
Operation Phantom Fury, some 100 Sunni soldiers chose to desert their
posts en route to Falluja. So it's not a surprise that we find
ourselves in the position we are in and one thing is certain - relying
on the same pillars of power as Saddam did will ensure continued
infiltrations, desertions and insurgency.

Most commentators and political advisors are now correctly identifying
the need for a political solution to couple the current military
operation in Falluja. However, they seem to have learnt nothing from
the past, as they are now advocating the same policy that was adopted
six months ago: calling for increased Sunni and 'clean' Baathist
representation in order to somehow appease the Sunni population.
Washington needs to be brave enough to discard Allawi's policy of
re-Baathification and Sunni-dominance and advocate what reality on the
ground has pointed to time and time again: de-Baathification coupled
with Shia-dominance in the leadership of the new security forces is
the only long-term option to crushing the insurgency and moving Iraq
towards democracy.

Sama Hadad is the spokeswoman for the Iraqi Prospect Organisation, a
pro-democracy group based in Baghdad and London.