Des Browne MP, Secretary of State for Defence outlines UK Defence Strategy in Iraq

Des Browne argues that reconciliation will take time, and none of us who have been involved in this kind of process before are under any illusion about how difficult and precarious it can be. Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and South Africa show that once reconciliation is put at the heart of the political process, as [Iraqi PM] Maliki has done, other aspects start to fall into place. We should remember the years of pessimism in each of these places, and reflect on the progress each has made, despite the very real difficulties that remain.

He outlines a three-pronged strategy: First, we are helping the Iraqis build up their own security forces. Second, as those forces develop we are handing them control, province by province, city by city, moving to the point where they have complete responsibility. Third, we are underwriting that handover process by leaving in place quick response forces – not to do front line security work but ready to support the Iraqis if the situation gets out of control.

Full Text of Chatham House speech

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to be able to give this lecture today here in Chatham House, which for almost a hundred years has been making a valuable contribution to debate on international issues.

Typical that on my first appearance here I won’t get to benefit from your famous Chatham House rules… But in fact our strategy in Iraq is something I am happy to debate in public.

Let me start by reading you a quote.

“No perspective is more false, no analysis more shallow than that of viewing Iraq in the context of the last three and a half years alone. Iraqi history did not start in 2003.”

So said Barham Salih, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, in September of this year. I hope whatever our other disagreements we can agree with this. If so, then all of us – politicians, military planners and commanders, commentators and interested members of the public – would do well to bear this in mind whenever we think and talk about this emotive subject.

To understand the challenges facing Iraq we must go back far beyond 2003, beyond the 35 years of dictatorship under Saddam, beyond even the drawing of Iraq’s boundaries by outside powers including ourselves 50 years before that. We have to go back to its historic and geographic roots: the ancient civilisation of Mesopotamia, fanning out from the two great river valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, home to the Hanging Gardens of Babylon and the majestic city of Ninaveh; and then, a thousand years after that, the site of the Abbasid Caliphate, a world force in commerce, learning, and culture.

Throughout this long history of progress and achievement, we can also discern deep and lasting currents of tension and instability. Iraq has always been a place where different populations – Kurd, Persian, Arab – rub up against each other. And it was the site of the first great bloody struggle of Islam: the struggle over the succession to the Prophet Mohammed, the origin of Islam's defining schism.

These tensions have never gone away. They were suppressed, brutally, under Saddam. As in the Balkans under Tito and elsewhere, such suppression simply hides the tensions or replaces them with a wider tension with the state itself. It puts off the day when the deeper tensions are brought into the open – which they must be, if they are to be resolved or accommodated. But history in the Balkans and elsewhere also shows that when they are brought into the open, the first result is often violence. People retreat into the certainty of old identities – and old fears and hatreds.

By removing Saddam, we have brought Iraq’s tensions back into the open. That does not mean we created them. It does not even mean, necessarily, we have made them worse in the long run. It is too early to say – and, frankly, far too easy to say if in truth you oppose the use of military force as a matter of principle.

But it is increasingly clear that until these tensions are dealt with, Iraq will not escape from its current troubles. It is also clear that they must in the end be dealt with by the Iraqis themselves. The Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki recognises this challenge, and I know from our conversations over recent months that it remains his highest priority. Through his programme of national reconciliation he has sought to confront and accommodate the tensions between Arab and Kurd, between Sunni and Shia. But his government is only six months old, and the fledgling political structures underneath it are still bedding in. He has to encourage the different groups to move on from settling old scores, or simply pursuing short term financial and political gain. But so far distrust remains the default position, and to many it still seems that the best route to power is not the number of votes they can secure, but the number of guns they can field on the streets.

Reconciliation will take time, and none of us who have been involved in this kind of process before are under any illusion about how difficult and precarious it can be. Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and South Africa show that once reconciliation is put at the heart of the political process, as Maliki has done, other aspects start to fall into place. We should remember the years of pessimism in each of these places, and reflect on the progress each has made, despite the very real difficulties that remain.

One of the chief tasks of the reconciliation process is to disentangle the different elements of the Sunni insurgency: the irreconcilables of Al Qaida from the Baathists and from disaffected Sunni youth. Again when it comes to Al Qaida in Iraq we are accused of creating the problem – but again that is too simplistic. Their hatred of the West goes back far beyond 2003 – a wider struggle whose connection to Iraq is essentially opportunistic. Al Qaida have tried to ally themselves with Iraq’s Sunni community, exploiting their fears and insecurities. For a time this worked, but the essential nihilism of their message, their brutal and alien methods and their patent lack of interest in the future of the Sunni community let alone the future of Iraq, has exposed them for what they are. In places like Al Anbar where once they were strongest, the Sunni are turning against them.

Let us be clear: Al Qaida remain a very serious challenge. But we know how to respond – and so increasingly do the Iraqis themselves. In other areas, the reconciliation process is still feeling its way. One of the complicating factors is the uncertainty over federalism. The new Iraqi constitution allows for a degree of autonomy. The Kurds, whose experience of this has been very positive, are pushing to go further, and so are some other groups. But while splitting the country into three states for Kurd, Sunni, and Shia is a seductive solution, it ignores the lessons of Iraq’s past – and has the potential to reinforce sectarian tensions rather than resolving them. The aim should be to promote legitimate identities within a unitary state, not to draw lines on a map which entrench sectarian or ethnic tensions.

A divided Iraq would also threaten regional stability. Even without that division Iraq is vulnerable to becoming a crucible for wider regional tensions – and again, this vulnerability has roots which go back far beyond 2003. It is vital now that Iraq’s neighbours give it full and undivided support. Some, despite their own natural affinity with Sunni or Shia, are welcoming a new unified Iraq as a worthwhile partner in a stable Middle East. Even Syria, whose motives the international community has often had cause to question, has shown signs of constructive engagement. Its Foreign Minister – the first senior-ranking Syrian official to visit Iraq since Saddam’s fall – has re-established diplomatic ties and stated that Damascus is ready to engage in dialogue and work for stability in Iraq and the region. But as ever we need to see actions to match the words.

Perhaps the most influential neighbour is Iran, and its behaviour remains a cause of deep concern. It has influence inside Iraq: the power to turn up or turn down the heat, to turn on or turn off the dialogue. It is not using that influence well. Support from within Iran goes to groups who are attacking our forces, but also to groups who are simply fuelling the sectarian violence. This is unacceptable, and also, in the end, counter-productive. Iran must start seeing Iraq not as a tool in a wider confrontation with the West, but as a vital interest in its own right. Iran’s interest is in a stable and non-aggressive Iraq. So the message to Iran is simple. Be a constructive partner, help yourself as well as the wider region – or face increasing isolation.

These then are the factors – historical, religious, cultural, and regional – which we must consider in facing the challenges in Iraq. They reinforce my view that lasting progress cannot be achieved by military means alone, but will depend on a combination of security, politics and economics. In times of extreme uncertainty, fear and violence win out over hope and cooperation. Security reduces the fear and uncertainty, allows the political process to start, and so enables people to address the rivalries and resentments which underlie the violence. Economic regeneration shows people there is sufficient wealth and opportunity to go round – put crudely, it gives people a sense that they have something to lose – and a reason to unite against those who continue to pursue violence.

So all three strands are vital. But to the extent that any of them can be said to have priority, it must be security. Without a basic level of security, it is hard to persuade people of the value of engaging with political solutions, or trying to build for the future.

And I know that it is the security situation that worries the British public most about Iraq. They worry that it is getting worse, or at best going sideways. If there is no realistic prospect of stopping the violence, they say, then there is no justification for continuing to expose our people to it.

I do not believe this – if I did, I would not allow British forces to stay. But nor do I underestimate the challenges, or the difficult and dangerous work our people have to do to meet them. And I accept that we can do better in articulating our security strategy, together with setting a realistic ambition for what can be achieved over the coming years.

As I said in Parliament last week there are limits to how far we can go in discussing our strategy in public – we owe a duty of confidentiality to our allies, including the Iraqi government who are an equal partner in this – but also and most importantly we owe a duty of care to our forces who are carrying out the strategy on the ground.

But the core principles can be discussed, and as I said at the start I am happy to do so. There are three main elements, and these have remained the same as long as I have been in this job. First, we are helping the Iraqis build up their own security forces. Second, as those forces develop we are handing them control, province by province, city by city, moving to the point where they have complete responsibility. Third, we are underwriting that handover process by leaving in place quick response forces – not to do front line security work but ready to support the Iraqis if the situation gets out of control.

I am convinced that this remains the right strategy – indeed the only one that could possibly work. What is changing is not the strategy but the pace at which it unfolds. Prime Minister Maliki and his Government want it to go faster. That is a natural response and a welcome sign of increasing confidence. But it also crystallises the great challenge Maliki faces. On the one hand, to keep up momentum, to reinforce a sense of progress and nationhood, he must show that Iraq is regaining control of its own destiny. At the same time he must not ask too much too quickly of its developing security forces. It is a fine balance. We are all frustrated at delay – we all want to move this process as fast as we can, without putting it at risk. But it is significant that among the voices calling for immediate withdrawal, there are no Iraqi politicians actually in a position of responsibility – and most of them, from President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki down, are clear that an immediate withdrawal would be catastrophic.

There are some parts of Iraq – especially Baghdad – where the reality on the ground is clearly a long way from the point where the Coalition can hand over. In Baghdad, sectarianism and violent power struggles are as bad as anywhere in Iraq. The misery they cause is compounded by terrorist atrocities like last Friday’s bombs in Sadr City – part of whose motive of course is precisely to provoke an escalating sectarian reaction. But Baghdad is not Iraq. I make no apology for reminding people that 14 of the 18 provinces are relatively peaceful. The security situation, and therefore progress along the security strategy, is different in each.

This is well illustrated in the four provinces under British lead in the South. In two of them, Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar, we were able to hand over to Iraqi control during the summer. Yes they were the less challenging provinces – but that’s why the handover process started there, and despite some sceptical predictions, the security situation remains stable. The Iraqi Police and Army are working together and are accountable to the civil authorities, not in the way we are used to here, but in a way that reflects local practices and needs.

The other two provinces, Maysan and Basra, have not been handed over. But that does not mean we are standing still. In Maysan in August we moved out of our fixed base near the main city Al Amarah, to make our forces more mobile. Attacks against us – most of which were mortar and rocket attacks on the fixed base – have reduced, and we are better placed to help the Iraqis protect the border with Iran.

A month ago Al Amarah saw serious disturbances – clashes between rival Shia factions – but it was the Iraqi police, reinforced by the Iraqi Army, who re-established order. They held the ring while a political solution was hammered out by politicians including Maliki’s envoys from Baghdad. Our forces stood ready to help – an example of what we mean by ‘overwatch’ – but were not required. As usual the instant media reaction here in Britain was to see this as another day of worsening violence in Iraq. But to those prepared to follow it through, and to look beneath the surface, this was in its own way a positive story. A story of the new Iraq challenged by violence but showing the political will to confront it, and the security muscle to back that political will.

The fourth province, Basra, remains the most difficult challenge in the South. But again the security situation is a symptom – the underlying cause is rival Shia power blocs vying for control over a province that has great economic potential. Regional powers sense this potential and its importance for the future of Iraq, and are keen to build links with the power blocs – but this just feeds the rivalry. Right now this is too much for the Iraqi security forces to deal with on their own – and there are real weaknesses in the local police – so unlike in the other three provinces in the South, British forces are still doing front-line work in the main city.

Last month we started a new joint operation with the Iraqi Army – Operation Sinbad – working through Basra city, area by area, re-establishing security, building confidence, rooting out corrupt and failing police, putting Iraqi soldiers on street corners as a sign that the Government is determined to govern. But again security is merely the first step. Engineers and local contractors are following on, bringing basic services like clean water, sewerage and rubbish collection. Early progress is encouraging. Levels of violence are down, and people are reporting a positive difference in their daily lives. The results are visible. They offer an alternative view of the future which ordinary Basrawis can understand, and buy into.

Of course as ever the question is whether the improvement will last, and more importantly whether it will build momentum. The Iraqi Government has started to release central resources to accelerate regeneration in Basra, meeting a need that until now has been met by international aid. The fact is, Iraq is in a better position than many places facing similar problems, in that it is not short of money – what it is short of is the confidence and the infrastructure to spend that money, and a mature political process to ensure it is spent and seen to be spent fairly. These things can take decades to mature – Iraq has to develop them, or rediscover them, in months or years. The relationship between Baghdad and Basra, soured by Saddam through decades of neglect and downright vandalism, is a good place to start.

I have said that I believe the strategy is making progress, and that despite the violence and terrible events like last Friday, if you are prepared to look you can see real evidence of this progress – more haltingly than we would like and not always in the precise direction we would choose – but that is inevitable. And progress against the strategy will bring a drawdown of our forces. We have said that we and the Iraqis hope they will be ready to take over Maysan in January. We have said – and the Foreign Secretary reiterated last week – that we hope they will be ready to take over Basra in the spring. If both of these go to plan, we will be able to start drawing down our forces. This will itself need careful handling. Those who have been attacking our forces will claim a propaganda victory, hoping to gain status in local power struggles. They will seek to portray a reduction in our forces as a victory for violence. They will claim they have driven us out. So as we move towards handover, perversely, attacks on us may increase.

So the process needs to be managed carefully, both in Iraq and here in the UK. We need to be clear that handover does not mean withdrawal. Even when all of the provinces are handed over we will still be providing a force to mentor and back up the Iraqi army and police, and to protect Coalition supply routes.

How large a force will this be? Again for the reasons I have set out, I do not believe it is right to give precise numbers, nor to assume what the next 12 months will hold. But I can tell you that by the end of next year I expect numbers of British forces in Iraq to be significantly lower – by a matter of thousands. The planning for this has been going on for some months, and I have been pressing our planners to look at all the options, to make sure we do not ask a single extra soldier to remain in Iraq longer than is necessary. In the end, of course, it must depend on conditions on the ground – including the level of threat and the capacity of the Iraqis to deal with it – and the final decision will be down to our commanders.

So this is our strategy. We will continue to support the Iraqis in overcoming the violence and intimidation that exacts a terrible cost in human lives and misery in the areas where politics is not yet working. We will work with them to build a long term relationship, including training and mentoring, to help the security of the country and the region, including dealing with the ongoing challenge of international terrorism. But both in security and in the parallel strands of politics and economic development we have to accept that how quickly things move will depend on many factors, not all of them directly under our control. In fact, it is a measure of success if the path of progress becomes increasingly an Iraqi one. We must get used to thinking not just in terms our strategy, but of our role in their strategy.

So while we can start to look forward to the end of this process, there is clearly much work still to be done. I am acutely aware of the effort, risk, and sacrifice this ongoing commitment requires from our armed forces – sadly demonstrated again on Friday with the death of Sergeant Jonathan Hollingsworth in Basra. I know from talking to them on the ground that what they want in return is a proper understanding back at home of what they are doing. I hope today I have gone some way to help that – and to explain why we continue to insist we are not going to cut and run. This is not about political gestures or a trial of wills, this is about recognising the challenges we face but also the commitment we have made. We will stay as long as we are making a positive difference and as long as the Iraqi government need our support; we will hand over when it is right to do so, driven not by arbitrary deadlines but by reality on the ground.

I repeat that I am determined not to allow a single one of the seven thousand British soldiers sailors and air personnel currently in Iraq to stay there any longer than necessary. Together with the chiefs I will work to ensure that our plans remain clear and realistic. But I will also work to resist cynicism and defeatism so long as I still believe we are making a difference – so long as I still believe the presence of our forces there is increasing the chance of a positive legacy for their work and sacrifice in Iraq in the last three years.