Opening Speech by Margaret Beckett MP in Commons debate

On Iraq, Margaret Beckett said: Our fundamental objective in Iraq has been and remains the same – to develop the capacity of the democratically-elected government of Iraq; and in particular to increase its ability to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi government of national unity has only been in place for eight months – something I think we often overlook. Governing by coalition is never an easy job. Doing so in a country which has been riven by decades of terror and oppression and in which there is no tradition of government by consensus is harder still. What is being tried in Iraq today – genuine power-sharing among the different major communities – has never even been tried before.

Full Text

Iraq and the Middle East

24 January 2007

The Middle East is a region that engages every aspect of that foreign policy: not just our security with regard to conflict, proliferation and terrorism, but also the security of our economy, of our energy supplies as well as of our climate. And it is a region critical to our deeper goal of building a safe, just and prosperous world for all.

This afternoon, I will concentrate on four areas: first, of course, Iraq itself; then Iran and Syria; third the Middle East Peace Process; and finally some comments on the wider political and economic reform needed in the region.

For the purposes of this debate I will address each in turn. But for the purposes of analysis and policy-making they are, of course, intimately linked. What happens in Iraq has direct consequences for political developments across the region. Iran and Syria present very distinct challenges for the international community but both have the ability to play a pivotal role – for good or ill – in Iraq, in the Middle East Peace Process and in the region as a whole. And the conflict between the Israel and the Palestinians, as has long been recognised, is a festering sore at the core of the region’s politics.

So we need – and we have – a strategy for the Middle East which recognises both the scale of the challenges and the links between them.

Iraq

First, then, Iraq.

Our fundamental objective in Iraq has been and remains the same – to develop the capacity of the democratically-elected government of Iraq; and in particular to increase its ability to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi government of national unity has only been in place for eight months – something I think we often overlook. Governing by coalition is never an easy job. Doing so in a country which has been riven by decades of terror and oppression and in which there is no tradition of government by consensus is harder still. What is being tried in Iraq today – genuine power-sharing among the different major communities – has never even been tried before.

Prime Minister Maliki has made a clear public commitment to bringing about national reconciliation.

As I said to Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi last week – and I think a number of members met him on his visit –, we strongly support this and we recognise how important it is to the future of Iraq. We have, this month, urged Prime Minister Maliki to redouble his efforts with all communities to demonstrate that his government is pursuing a national and non-sectarian agenda. And we are providing help and support including through sharing our experience from Northern Ireland.

The greatest challenge that the relatively new Iraqi government faces is ongoing violence.

Eighty to ninety per cent of that violence takes place within a 30-mile radius of Baghdad – in contrast, the four southern provinces account for around four per cent. So progress in Baghdad is of immense strategic and symbolic importance to the whole of Iraq.

On 6th January Prime Minister Maliki signalled his firm intention to get to grips with sectarian violence in Baghdad and Anbar. His actual words were: “We will not allow anyone to be an alternative to the state, whether the militias or anybody else, regardless of their affiliations…We will confront them firmly”.

On 10th January, President Bush said that the US would help the Iraqis to deliver greater and more lasting security to the capital. It is the joint judgement of the Iraqi and the American governments that the Baghdad Security Plan – including the announced increase in troop numbers but, equally importantly, increased resources for reconstruction – is the best way to achieve that goal.

I know that this House has shown great interest in the implications of the new Baghdad Security Plan for our own involvement in southern Iraq. The Defence Secretary and I discussed this at some length and in some detail on 11 January at a joint session of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees. I do not intend to repeat everything that was said on that occasion.

But one point does bear repetition. We have always said that our approach in Iraq, and the level of our commitments there, must be governed by conditions on the ground. We have not set arbitrary timelines. And, like our coalition and Iraqi partners, we have tailored our approach to tackle most effectively the challenges in our area of operation.

As we have explained repeatedly, the challenges in southern Iraq differ significantly from those in Baghdad and its neighbouring provinces, which have heavily mixed populations and have suffered – and tragically are suffering – from intense sectarian violence. In the overwhelmingly Shia south of Iraq, the challenge is to improve the quality of governance and the capacity of the Iraqi security forces; and to reduce crime and the role of the militias.

Our troops and our diplomats operate in a dangerous and difficult environment. The House has been consistent in its praise for their professionalism and for their courage. I pay tribute to them again.

Their combined military and civilian efforts have led to positive change in Basra over recent months.

The murder rate is down. The number of kidnappings has fallen. Significantly more police stations in Basra province have reached the standard required for transition to Iraqi control.

And we have made important progress in unlocking investment in the region’s future from the Iraqi authorities themselves. Our Provincial Reconstruction Team has helped the Basra Provincial Council gain approval for over 300 new projects funded by the Iraqi government.

President Bush reaffirmed in his 10 January statement that he expected that lead responsibility for security in all 18 provinces of Iraq would be handed back to the Iraqi authorities by November. We support that aim.

As the House knows, decisions on the transfer of individual provinces are made jointly, with the Iraqi Prime Minister having the final say.

The process of transition is already well underway. Two provinces in our area of responsibility, Dhi Qar and Muthanna, have already been transferred to Iraqi control. A third province, Najaf, in the US sector, was transferred last month.

In the light of the progress I have already described, we remain confident that at some point this Spring, we will be able to recommend that Basra province too is ready for this process of transition.

The Prime Minister told the House on 10 January that, as Operation SINBAD draws to a close, an assessment of progress in Basra would be made, following which, he will make a statement.

The transfer of authority is an important step. It marks a new stage in the development of a stable, independent and democratic Iraq. It does not, of course, mark the end of the international community’s support for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people.

Iran and Syria

The role of some of Iraq’s neighbours is deeply worrying.

Iran continues to supply weapons, training and funding to extremists operating in the south of Iraq and to Hizbollah in Lebanon.

The Iranians should be in no doubt that – in the long-term – they have as much to lose as anyone else, if not more, from encouraging instability in Iraq.

Here, as elsewhere, the Iranian regime has a very clear strategic choice to make. On the one hand it can provide its young and very talented population with all the benefits they would get from a new partnership with the rest of the international community. To do that they must meet the requirements of the IAEA Board backed by UN Security Council over their nuclear programme; play a constructive role in Iraq, in the Middle East Peace Process and across the region; and end their support for terrorism.

The alternative option is for the Iranian regime to lead its country and its people into increasing political, economic and cultural isolation.

Iran has consistently tried to portray itself as the victim of a vindictive led solely by the US and UK. They hoped to exploit perceived differences between members of the Security Council. But they have badly and repeatedly misjudged the situation. At the end of last year the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737. It is plain even to the government of Iran that the entire international community calls on Iran to meet its obligations.

Iran must also meet its international obligations and standards in the way it treats its own people. After China, Iran executes more people than any other country in the world. Recently ten Ahwazi men were sentenced to death for alleged terrorist activities. But we understand that the men did not have adequate access to lawyers and the trial was held behind closed doors. We urge the government to allow these men a fair and public hearing.

As for Syria we continue to be concerned about the nature of its involvement in Iraq, Lebanon and over Palestine.

On the positive side, since Sir Nigel Sheinwald visited Damascus last October there has been some strengthening of relations between Syria and Iraq. The Syrian Foreign Minister has visited Baghdad and Syria has re-established full diplomatic ties with Iraq. The Iraqi interior minister has been to Damascus to talk to the Syrians about disrupting what the Iraqis perceive to be a flow of fighters and weapons across the Syrian/Iraqi border. President Talabani spoke about the same issues when he visited Syria last week.

On the other hand, I fear we are still looking for evidence that Syria is ready to play a constructive role in promoting stability in Lebanon, or in supporting President Abbas’s efforts on behalf of the Palestinians.

But Syria, like Iran, faces a similar strategic choice to Iran: either to act responsibly or to continue to support terrorism and hold back progress in the region.

We will continue to engage diplomatically with both countries.

Middle East Peace Process

As the Prime Minister has repeatedly stated, progress on the Middle East Peace Process must remain our highest priority.

The UK and the international community continue to support the Palestinian people, including through the Temporary International Mechanism, to which the UK will contribute £12 million. Last year, the European Union spent 680 million Euro supporting the Palestinians – more than in any other year.

We welcome the recent agreement between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas on the release US$100 million in Palestinian tax revenues and on the easing of restrictions on movement and access.

These practical steps are an essential foundation to the effort towards a comprehensive peace and two-state solution, and an end to the cycle of violence.

In this respect too there have been recent positive developments. The Gaza ceasefire is holding. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas met. And I believe that there is also a new willingness on all sides to address some of the fundamental issues that underpin the conflict.

We will encourage and support this, working closely with the US and EU and Arab partners. The Prime Minister was in the region last month. I intend to go again shortly. Secretary Rice visited last week. We then held detailed talks here in London, covering both the need to re-energise the political process and practical ways to support President Abbas and help the Palestinian people.

Our common goal is to see accelerated implementation of the Roadmap, and real progress toward peace and stability for both parties. The next step is a meeting of the Quartet on 2 February.

Wider Political and Economic Developments

These points of tension in the region – Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel/Palestine – all present different problems. They demand and deserve individual attention. But they are also affected by and pivotal to wider political and economic reform in the region.

Long-term stability in the Middle East demands a truly comprehensive approach – what the Prime Minister has called “a whole Middle East strategy”. That means resolving the big conflicts. But it also means helping economies in the region to modernise, create more jobs, attract more inward investment. It means giving the young people in the region – men and women alike – the tools and the education to embrace globalisation. And it means making progress towards more open politics, more accountable government and better respect for individual rights.

The challenges we face in the region should not blind us to significant and positive development across the Middle East and North Africa over the last few years; developments that often have profound implications for the UK.

From what is admittedly a low base, foreign direct investment is now growing. In Egypt it has risen from just over US$2 billion a year to over US$5 billion – including very substantial UK investments. Shell is about to make the largest ever investment by a British company in Qatar. BP is the biggest foreign investor in Algeria.

On the political front we’ve seen the first elections in Saudi Arabia, universal suffrage in Kuwait, the most successful elections in Yemen’s history.

And there has been an improvement in the rights of women: in Egypt women can now divorce; in Bahrain a Supreme Council for Women has been established; in Morocco there is a new, fairer family code.

It would be wrong to overplay such progress but, broadly speaking, it is, at least, heading in the right direction. The people in the region are leading this change. But we can help them.

We are doing so partly through our political relationships.

There are certainly many on the so-called “Arab Street” who are suspicious of British foreign policy. But among local politicians we are still seen by many not only as an honest broker in the region and but also as a close ally and friend. It is one of the reasons why – during the Lebanon crisis – it was, for example, the UK that was entrusted with the job of flying the first international envoys into Beirut. It is why, when Libya wanted to come in from the cold, they made contact with the British Government. It is why we can discuss the reform agenda with the Saudi Arabians through our Two Kingdoms dialogue.

We use this political influence to encourage locally-led political and economic reforms. And we back it up with money and expertise.

That includes the small-scale but highly targeted work of the FCO’s Global Opportunities Fund: for example, supporting a youth parliament in Bahrain; teaching business and leadership skills to women in Kuwait; strengthening NGOs in Saudi Arabia.

Last November we hosted the Yemen donors conference in London. More than US$4.5 billion was pledged in support of Yemen’s national reform agenda. And we announced a five-fold increase in our own aid programme – around US$225 million over the next four years.

This afternoon I shall be going to Paris to discuss how the international community can support reconstruction and reform in Lebanon. The UK has already committed more than US$50 million to Lebanon, including humanitarian relief and 47 Land Rovers for the Lebanese armed forces. At the Paris conference, I will reaffirm our determination, which I think is shared across the House, to stand by the government and people of Lebanon.

Alongside this work, the UK is influencing how the international community spends its money – making support for reform one of the main priorities. During our G8 Presidency, the Forum for the Future established a US$50 million Foundation to support democracy and a US$100 million fund to support regional entrepreneurs.

We are strong advocates of the recently proposed EU Governance Facility, which will provide additional funding to those countries that make the most progress on good governance. The exact size of that fund is still being decided but we are talking about hundreds of millions of euros.

The challenges we face in the Middle East are complex and – as the whole of this House recognises – they are extremely difficult. But they are not wholly intractable. And the prize on offer is an immense one – we can help the people of the region to overcome a legacy of underdevelopment and conflict and give them the chance to carve out better lives for themselves and their families. That is the task to which we in this Government are committed.