There are no easy options left in Iraq, only painful ones.

Iraq Commission Report

Here is the full report of the Iraq Commission to which LFIQ gave evidence. The executive summary is below.

There are no easy options left in Iraq, only painful ones.

The UK has a legal and moral responsibility to Iraq. Under Resolution 1483 and subsequent UN resolutions, the British hold shared responsibility in international law for what happened during and after the invasion of Iraq.

Whilst much has been achieved by the coalition in ending the regime of a brutal dictator and the holding of elections, it is now clear that the initial, over ambitious vision of the coalition can no longer be achieved in Iraq. The UK government needs, therefore to redefine its objectives. In the words of Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the former British Special Representative in Iraq, “We thought we were going to achieve something good, that has not happened. It’s actually time for change. It is time to do something about it.”

It is the view of the Commission that the UK government’s aims for Iraq should now be to:

• Preserve and underpin the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state.

• Support a strongly federal internal structure for the Iraqi state, as envisaged, but not yet implemented, under the present constitution.

• Promote the constructive engagement of Iraq’s neighbours in the achievement of the above aims, and support any initiative aimed at stabilising the region.

• Prevent Iraq being a base for al Qaeda attacks within Iraq and beyond its borders.

The UK should also work with the international community actively to urgently promote a wider Middle East settlement, centred on a resolution of the Israel Palestine conflict, which provides the best context in which a long term resolution to Iraq’s problems can be secured.

These aims form the necessary political framework within which all the subsequent recommendations in this report are anchored.

If there was one view that was given in evidence to the commission time and again it was that ultimately: only Iraqis can make Iraq better – but they need help.

Therefore, the task for the commission was how the UK should best discharge its responsibilities, commensurate with British interests and enable the Iraqis to better control their own destiny.

After hearing testimony from a wide range of witnesses: Iraqis within and outside Iraq; British diplomats and politicians; humanitarian and international organisations; and others the Commission has put forward the following recommendations:

• The UK should promote an urgent international political effort, under UN Security Council auspices and involving Iraq’s neighbours, to provide international treaty protection for Iraq’s territorial integrity and provide support for the building up of a strongly federal internal structure for the Iraqi state
based on the current constitution. In parallel a high level new UN envoy should be appointed to facilitate internal political reconciliation.

• The UK should refocus its military activity, progressively ceasing offensive military operations and bringing to completion its programme of training and building the capacity of the Iraqi security forces. As Iraqi forces complete their training, and are demonstrably capable, they will assume responsibility for security. This handover should not be dependent on the prevailing security situation.

• The UK should, with the International Compact with Iraq, develop an economic roadmap for Iraq, with a strong emphasis on the liberalisation of the Iraqi economy and the creation of small and medium sized enterprises so that as the security situation improves on the ground, the economic benefits of peace can take root as soon as possible.

• The UK should give full support to the UNHCR to develop and implement a strategy that addresses the humanitarian and security consequences of the two million refugees from Iraq, the one million refugees expected over the next year, and the two million Iraqis displaced within Iraq. These people represent an
emerging humanitarian tragedy and a longer term strategic security risk for the entire region.

The Commission recognises that these recommendations are in some cases at variance with positions hitherto taken by the US Administration. Nonetheless, we believe that the British Government should make clear both privately to the US and publicly that it believes that this course of action both reflects British and wider interests and is the most likely to reduce the violence and offer Iraqis a more stable future.